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Alienation: The Case of the Catholics in Northern Ireland
EDWARD
P. MoxoN-BRoWN
E
Queen's University of Belfast

Introduction
The word 'alienation' carries a number of intrinsic connotations that
are useful when examining a case of political alienation. For Marx, the
estrangement of the individual from himself was to be remedied by abolition of private property so that the plight of the individual worker, forced
to be simply the means to an economic end, might be shortcircuited. Freud
saw the individual estranged from himself by living up to the expectations
of others so that (as Marcuse was later to point out) the individual was no
longer the originator of his own acts; he was no longer his true self. He lost
interest in life because it was not he who was living it.
Clearly, when we are talking about alienation of the Catholic community in Northern Ireland, we are using the term at a more superficial
level. However, the historical and socio-psychological antecedents of the
term are valuable adjuncts to the specifically political analysis. The
alienated citizen is often apathetic because he is not recognized for what he
is; and his identity may, at best, be ignored or, at worst, be denigrated.
Political lassitude follows logically from a political identity being ghettoised
into a backwater far removed from mainstream political life. A dictionary
definition of 'alienation' will mention being 'estranged, ' 'foreign in nature,'
and 'belonging to another place, person or family, especially to a foreign
nation or allegiance.'' Such a definition usefully bridges the gap between
the psychological ('estranged') aspect of the term and the political ('Belonging to a foreign nation or allegiance') dimension. This coupling of two
aspects of alienation are especially pertinent when we consider the Catholic
minority in Northern Ireland.
In a political context the term alienation denotes the sense of being or
feeling, foreign. The alienated group is one that feels foreign although it
resides within the state; it feels that it does not fully belong to the wider
society and often withdraws into itself and becomes increasingly aware of
its separate identity. Such a group is often a numerical minority but it need
not be so . The crucial attributes are that it sees itself as being subordinate or
marginal to the dominant political culture. Thus Blacks in South Africa,
although numerically a majori _ty, are best analyzed as a minority, and an
alienated minority within the South African state. Most alienated groups,
however, are, numerically speaking, minority groups in a larger society, e.g.
the Tamils of Sri Lanka, the Jews of the Soviet Union, or the Sikhs in India.
The word 'alienation' has recently become a prominent weapon in the
battle of words between politicians in Britain and Ireland when referring to
the position of the Catholic community in Northern Ireland. The New
Ireland Forum Report 2 ascribed the impasse in Northern Ireland to the
'alienation of nationalists in Northern Ireland from political and civil institutions, from the security forces and from the manner of application of
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identity of Catholics could be expressed. More recently, after the AngloI . h summit, the communique spoke of the need to cater for the separate
-~is tity and aspirations of the minority. However, more recently still,
~~nvember 1984) both the British Prime Minister (Mrs. Thatcher) and the
: Northern Ireland Secretary (Mr. Hurd) publicly deplored the use of the
::rd alienation implying that it was both an exaggeration and inaccurate.
In response to those state'!1en~s t_her~has been no shortage ~f sp?kesmen
for the Catholic community md1catmg the extent of the alienation they
perceive among their coreligionists. For example, the Bishop of Down and
Connor, whose diocese includes Belfast, wrote in late November of 1984:
It has been claimed this week, even at Prime
Ministerial and Secretary of State level, that the degree
of alienation has been exaggerated, perhaps even that
the term itself if inappropriate. Living in day to day
contact with the situation as I do, I have to assert quite
categorically that the alienation in the nationalist community is real, it is profound, it 1s increasing, it is
spreading
to more and more sectors of that
community. 3
Since there appears to be wide disagreement between leading actors in
the Northern Ireland situation as to whether and, if so how much, alienation is experienced by the Catholic community, it is timely for some kind of
analysis to be carried out. Otherwise, there is a danger that the word alienation will simply become a rhetorical device for political point scoring.
Already, in fact, some spokesmen for the majority Protestant community
have pointed to the alienation that they feel, for example, at policemen being gunned down in the streets. This sort of counter charge, based as it undoubtedly is on a real sense of grievance, risks devaluing the intrinsic worth
of 'alienation' as a political concept. The experience of alienation, claimed
by the Catholic community has important policy implications. The state
must, presumably, react to alienation if it perceives it as being widespread.
To ignore alienation, or to wish it away by pretending it is not there, could
lead to policies that are not simply unhelpful, but actually counterproductive.
In this paper, the term alienation will be operationalized along a continuum ranging from abstentionism at one extreme to support for violence
against the state, at the other. The actual components of alienation that are
being examined here are (in ascending order of gravity):
(a) identification with a national ethos distinct from the national ethos
of the majority
(b) support for policies involving another state in policy-making; and,
at the same time, abstentionism from the political process within
the state
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(c) lack of support for, and hostility to, the judicial system, the forces
of law and order, and the penal system of the state
(d) support for political parties that condone violence as a means of ef.
fecting political change; support for paramilitary groups; support
for violence to overthrow the state.
Fortunately for the social scientist, there are numerous mass opinion
surveys in Northern Ireland that can be used to facilitate a reasonably accurate measurement of the four components of alienation outlined above.
Mass opinion surveys can be buttressed by election results and the policy
programmes of political parties. From such measurement, a num ber of
hypotheses suggest themselves:
(a) the Catholic community experiences alienation to a greater or
lesser degree in terms of the above components
(b) alienation is, however, experienced in varying degrees of severity;
and socioeconomic status, age and political party affiliation will be
variables strongly associated with experience of alienation
(c) tensions within the Catholic community are attributable not so
much to the differential experience of alienation, but to the means
of overcoming it.
Our analysis will proceed in three steps. First, we will place the
Catholic community in its demographic context. Second, in the main body
of the paper, we will analyse each of the four components of alienati on in
terms of mass opinion survey evidence . Thirdly, we will reappraise each of
our hypotheses in the light of the evidence that has been adduced, an d conclude with an assessment of the extent to which they can be confirme d or rejected.

The Catholic community
The national population census in the United Kingdom is con ducted
once every ten years. The most recent census (1981) is not a completely
reliable statement of the religious complexion of the Northern Ireland
population because there was a considerable resistance (especially among
Catholics) to the question on the religion of the respondent and, to a lesser
extent, to filling out the census form at all. It has been estimated th at 22%
of the total population in Northern Ireland failed to state their religion
either because they refused to answer the relevant question or because they
refused to fill in a form. This short-fall is reckoned to be about twice as
great as that of the previous census in 1971.• This resistance to the census
can itself be regarded as a symptom of alienation in the Catholic community: census forms were burnt in public on the streets, and a female census
enumerator was shot dead.
As part of its task of ensuring that employment patterns reflect the
local denominational structure of the population, the Fair Employ ment
Agency in Northern Ireland undertook a study to ascertain, more accurately
than the 1981 census, the size of the Catholic community. 5 This Report
made use of school registers, parochial records, and government-spo nsored
household surveys. The Report, published in 1985, concluded that the
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C tholic share of the total population (1,562,200) was 39.1 % in 1981, coma ed with 340/o as reported in the 1981 census (and 31% in the 1971
pa~sus). The Catholic community is relatively youthful: 460/o of the
c~der-15's in the Province were Catholic, and 36% of the adults. Moreover,
~e fertility rate remains higher among Catholics than Protestants (the ratio
f children to married women for Catholics and Protestants is 2.57 and 1.6
~espectively).Of the 26 loc~l government districts in Nort~er~ Ireland, eig~t
have a majority of Catholic adults, but twelve have a maJonty of Catholic
schoolchildren. Given the age profile of the Catholic community, and its
relatively higher fertility rate, it has been suggested that the minority in
Northern Ireland could become a majority early in the next century. If we
extrapolate present reproductive differentials between the two communities, and assume no emigration, it is possible to foresee the Catholic
community becoming a majority of the voting-age population by the year
2025.6
The purpose of the foregoing remarks is to emphasize that the Catholic
minority in Northern Ireland is (a) a very large minority and (b) increasing
in size both relatively and absolutely. This has important repercussions for
our discussion of alienation among Catholics. It is easier for a group that
constitutes, say, 5% of the total population (e.g. Protestants in the
Republic of Ireland), to accept that its political leverage or access to
economic resources may be marginal in terms of the national total. It is
much more difficult for a minority constituting 40% of the population to
accept inferior treatment in economic, political or judicial domains. As the
relative size of the Catholic community increases, the pressure on the national government in London to accommodate these increased demands
(especially when expectations are higher) will increase pari passu .
On this 'bedrock of alienation' lies a substructure of perceived relative
deprivation vis-a-vis the chosen reference group i.e . the Protestant majority. In the political sphere, a high degree of overlap 1 between religious affiliation and party identification means that the Catholic minority parties
have been effectively excluded from policy-making since 1922. The refusal
of the Protestant majority parties to countenance any form of 'partnership'
or 'consociationalism" as a formula for giving Catholics access to real
political power, has alienated the two main Catholic parties from the
political process. This marginality of the Catholic community to the
political process is compounded by its marginality in other key state agencies e.g. the police (where Catholic participation is about 10%); the Civil
Service (where a recent report 9 showed that 'Roman Catholics are not adequately represented at the key policy-making levels'); and in the judiciary
where only three out of twenty judges are Catholics.
More immediate, perhaps, is the marginality of the Catholic community to the region's economic life. Aunger 10 has shown that 'there is a marked
tendency for Protestants to dominate the upper occupational classes while
Catholics are found predominantly in the lower classes.' Aunger also found
that Catholics are two and a half times more likely to be unemployed than
Protestants. In his 1978 mass opinion survey, Moxon-Browne found 7% of
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his Protestant respondents and 14% of his Catholic respondents without
jobs. 11 Catholic males are particularly badly affected. They constit ute less
than 21 % of the economically active population, but 44% of the
unemployed. Within work contexts, Protestants are more likely to be found
in supervisory roles or high status positions than are Catholics. Thus in the
medical sector, for example, 21 % of doctors are Catholic, but 43% of
nurses. In education, Catholics have 15% of the administrative posit ions
but 39% of those in teaching. The rather high proportion of Cat holics in
non-manual occupations is attributed by Aunger to the need of the Catholic
community to 'service' itself. Thus teachers and clergymen account for onethird of Catholic non-manual occupations while the equivalent figure for
the Protestant community is 19%. In a highly segregated society, the existence of a Catholic middle class, whose primary role is to cater to the
needs of its own community, does little to mitigate the margina lity of
Catholics in the economy generally.

The components of 'alienation'
We turn now to consider the four components of Catholic alienation
mentioned earlier. The first of these was 'identification with a national
ethos distinct from the national ethos of the majority.' The birth of Northern Ireland as a political entity was destined to guarantee a bifurcate d sense
of national identity within its boundaries. Ireland had never been absorbed
politically or culturally into the United Kingdom as effectively as Scotland
or Wales. In 1920, Northern Ireland might have left the United Kingdom
had it not been for the determination of a majority of its inhabitants to remain part of a British state. The resulting constitutional formu la was a
messy compromise (a devolved government) that pleased no-one. Catholics
felt aggrieved that they were now 'trapped' in a 'Protestant state;' the Protestants felt aggrieved that their region was now to be governed at one
remove from London; and the British government was less than pleased at
being unable to offload responsibility for the region onto a government in
Dublin .
The legacy of this settlement was that national identity became a
divisive concept. Broadly speaking, Catholics tended to look south to the
government in Dublin as the appropriate focus for their Irish nation al identity. Protestants continued to look towards London as the focus for their
British identity. Politics within the region became rooted in the constitutional question: most Catholics persisted in feeling that their identit y could
not be given true expression except in an all-Ireland state (and this aspiration was given some legitimacy by the Constitutional claim to the territory
of Northern Ireland by the Republic of Ireland). Most Protestants persisted
in their fear that their British identity would be in jeopardy if Irish unity was
ever achieved, and in their belief that their economic, political and cultural
interests could only be safeguarded within a British state .
Opinion survey evidence suggests that Catholics are surer of their national identity than are Protestants. When asked to indicate their national
'label,' Catholics will overwhelmingly reply 'Irish' while P rotest ant s may
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'Ulster' or 'British.' Rose argues that Protestants national identity is
s:tly based on a negative reaction to being thought of as 'Irish:' they may
~ vague about what they are, but they are sure about what they are not.
T~is is confirmed in Rose's finding that most Irish people a_ttribute their naf1onality to being 'born and bred' (93% of the group) while 53% of those
ho see themselves as British attribute this to being 'under British rule' (an
~ herently less secure basis for national allegiance). 12
!fl
In Table 1, we can see the extent to which national identity follows
eligious lines in Northern Ireland. We can also see that, in the ten-year
~eriod (1968-78), being British (and not being Irish) has become more important for Protestants.
Table 1
Nonhern identity in Northern Ireland:
Comparisons between 1968 and 1978

Which of these terms best describes the way you usually think of yourself? British. Irish, Ulster, Sometimes
Quesuon: British, Somc1imes lrish, Anglo-Irish, Other?
Catholics 0/o
1968
1978
British

IS

IS

Irish

76
S

69
6

Ulster

Protestants 0/o
1968
1978
39
67
20
8
32
20

N 8 Percentages arc rounded to the nearest digiL Responses for 'British' 'Irish' and 'Ulster' only are shown .
. . N = 1291 (1968) 1277 (1978).

Sourc,: E. Moxon -Browne, Nation, Class and Creed in Northern Ireland. Alder shot: Gower (1983), p , 6.

In addition to this clear evidence that Catholic identify with the national ethos of the inhabitants of the Republic of Ireland, there is also
evidence that they have more contact with them. In answer to the question
'Have you ever travelled to the Republic?' 64% of Catholics but only 37%
of Protestants replied that they visited on 'many occasions' or 'regularly.' 13
Next, we consider the second component of alienation: 'support for
policies involving another state in policy-making; and, at the same time
abstentionism from the political process within the state.' The largest party
in the Catholic community is the Social Democratic and Labour Party
(SDLP). It was founded in 1970 as the heir to the Nationalist Party that had
carried the banner for Catholic opposition to the regime in Northern
Ireland ever since its inception. The aim of the SDLP was, and still is, to act
as the party of 'constitutional nationalism' playing the role of 'legitimate
opposition' to the majority-dominated political system in the Province.
Throughout, the party has been hampered by its inbuilt numerical inferiority and this has caused the party leadership (especially under John Hume) to
attempt a broadening of the political debate to include (or involve) at one
time or another various external actors e.g. the Dublin government, the
British government, the EEC, and the United States.
The latest phase in this broadening process was the establishment of the
New Ireland Forum in 1982. This was a conference of four political parties
(three from the Republic, and the SDLP from Northern Ireland) whose task
it was to map out a blueprint for a 'new Ireland' in which Catholic and Protestant, north and south, would peacefully coexist. The Report from the
Forum mapped out three possible scenarios for the future of Ireland but
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each was eventually ruled out by the British government as being impractical at this time .
For our purposes, the importance of the New Ireland Forum was that it
represented an attempt by the SDLP to enlist the involvement of political
parties in another state; and thus reflected the alienation of the party from
the status quo in Northern Ireland. The idea that the government of the
Republic should be involved in any political settlement in Northern Ireland
is one that is very attractive to Catholics (but distasteful to Protestants who
see such involvement as the 'meddling' of a 'foreign power' in the inte rnal
affairs of the United Kingdom). Successive opinion surveys show how important the involvement of the Republic is for Catholics. In 1978 780/oof
Catholics agreed that 'in any political settlement in Northern Irelan d the
Irish government would have to be consulted' (300/oof Protestants). Two
years later, in response to the suggestion that the Republic's govern ment
'should be involved in discussions about the future form of governm ent in
Northern Ireland' 580/oof Catholics (140/oof Protestants) agreed." In 1984,
when asked if the government of the Republic of Ireland should 'hav e any
say in constitutional changes affecting Northern Ireland, or not' 6 1OJoof
Catholics said Yes (100/oof Protestants). 15
The two principal political parties, in the Catholic comm unity, the
SDLP and Provisional Sinn Fein (PSF), have followed an abst ent ionist
policy with regard to some aspects of the political process in Northern
Ireland. Both parties now participate in elections at four different levels of
representation: local government; the regional assembly (in Belfast); the national parliament (in London); and the European Parliame nt (in
Strasbourg, France) . However, a distinction can be made between th e two
parties' policy regarding taking up seats after an election. PSF takes its seats
in the local government elections but not in the regional assembly or the national parliament, whereas the SDLP takes its seats in the local government
elections, in the national and European Parliament, but not in the regional
Assembly. The objection of PSF to taking its seats in the regional an d national forum is that it does not wish to accord them legitimacy, whereas the
local government councils are seen as valuable channels of influence to and
from grass-roots opinion. The SDLP takes its seats in all cases except the
regional Assembly because it regards the Assembly, established in 1982, as
being inadequate since it has no 'Irish dimension' (i.e. no link with the
Republic of Ireland). This policy of abstentionism, followed in diff erent
degrees by the two Catholic parties means that the Catholic community has
virtually no representation in the regional Assembly 16 and only one
representative in the Westminster Parliament (out of 17 MP's from Northern Ireland). Abstentionism is clearly a popular policy in the Catholic community since both parties have, between them, held on to their share of the
vote in the last three elections. Participation in elections is a way of receiving a mandate for abstentionism. Abstentionism is a clear sympto m of
political alienation.
Our third component of alienation was 'lack of support for, and
hostility to, the judicial system, the forces of law and order, and the penal
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tem.' For the Catholic community, the way the law is applied and ensfys ed is a litmus test of the state's declared intention of providing impartial
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contribution to alienation.
The legitimacy of the state is inextricably tied up with the legal
easures required to maintain law and order e.g. the Emergency Provisions
:ct 1978 and the Prevention of Terrorism Act 1984. Both Acts shift the
onus of proof on to the accused in some circumstances e.g. possession of
firearms or explosives found on premises in the case of the EPA, and in the
case of the PTA, an individual can be required to live in a part of the United
Kingdom for reasons which are unspecified and against which it is therefore
difficult to construct a defence. 11 A range of offences in both Acts are tried
in special courts without a jury. The EPA still contains within it a provision
for internment without trial although this is currently in abeyance.
However, a source of considerable grievance is that suspects are being
remanded without trial for periods of one or two years awaiting their cases
to come to court. In March 1984 the House of Commons was told that 108
people had spent more than a year in custody awaiting trial.
Another issue that has become a source of grievance and controversy is
the use of 'supergrasses' i.e. the convicting of a number of accused persons
on the evidence of one person who is himself accused of a serious crime.
There are a number of objections that have been raised to the use of
'supergrasses': an individual may settle old scores by implicating a person
he dislikes; the police may be tempted to construct false evidence for the
supergrass to use in his ' story;' the payment of money and the granting of
immunity from prosecution to the supergrass means that a terrorist may
escape trial and punishment. In general, the system of supergrasses has
tended to discredit the judicial system and is partly to blame for the alienation of the Catholic community from it.
In the last two years the apparent adoption of a 'shoot to kill' policy on
the part of the security forces has further alienated the Catholic community.
The members of the police and army are almost exclusively Protestant, the
victims of the shootings invariably Catholic. During 1983, seventeen people
were killed by either the British Army or the Royal Ulster Constabulary
(RUC). Thirteen members of the security forces were charged in connection
with seven of these killings. In all cases there were long delays in bringing
the cases to court; and in all cases the soldiers and police were acquitted.
Even moderate Catholic opinion has been alienated by these apparent
travesties of ju stice. In a recent policy document, the SDLP says:
The fact that these trials were heard in non-jury courts
with the repeated appearances of the same judges in
almost every case gave rise to a serious questioning of
the impartiality of the judiciary and whether it was now
legal for British soldiers or the RUC to kill civilians with
impunity. The situation unfortunately remains unchanged with no solider or policeman being convicted of
a killing of a civilian while on duty in the streets of
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Northern Ireland. Such a position has, must and continues to lead, to great alienation from the judicial process. 18
The use of plastic bullets by the security forces, as a riot control
weapon, has been condemned by the European Parliament and avoided in
all parts of the United Kingdom except Northern Ireland. By the beginning
of 1985 fifteen people had been killed by plastic bullets, some of the victims
being children under 15. The use of plastic bullets has been condemned by
the SDLP since they sometimes kill innocent bystanders; they represent an
excessively dangerous weapon in circumstances where 'minimum force' is
the legal maxim governing riot control; and the rules governing their use are
often broken by the security forces. 19 The failure to prosecute, let alone
convict, those who have killed civilians with plastic bullets has 'contri buted
and continues to contribute to the alienation of a substantial and increasing
section of the nationalist population from the judicial system as a whole. •20
In sum, the panoply of special laws in Northern Ireland gives the RUC
and Army the legal back-up for stopping, searching, detaining, arre sting
and questioning individuals (mainly young unemployed Catholics) and this
constant surveillance by the forces of law and order can itself breed resentment, and a sense of alienation which, in turn, only makes the task of these
forces harder in the future. In a society where national identity is divided, it
would be more conducive to gaining the support of 'Irish' Catholics for the
judicial system if flags, crests, emblems and other symbols of 'British' identity were erased from the court buildings. The alienation of many Catholics
from the judicial system is emphasized when they feel that they are receiving
'British' or 'Protestant' justice in the courts.
In Table 2, we set out some opinion survey evidence that indicat es the
extent to which Catholics are unsupportive of the law and order being
dispensed in Northern Ireland.
Table 2
Qu .. tlon
How fair do you 1hink 1hc

Very fair

RUC is in the discharge of

Fair

Catholics "lo
43

Do you think that in rhe main
the legal sys1em in Northern
Ireland dispenses justice

Very fairly
Fairly
Unfairly

32

very fairly, fairly, unfairly,

4

Proleslaot~ f/o
37
59

its duties in Northern Ireland?

Question
4

25
64
7

Very unfairly

37
20

Approve
Disapprove

9
87

86

Should be
Should no, be

10

81

35
46

2

or very unfairly?

Qu .. uon
Do you approve or disapprove

of the use of plastic bullets
by the securityforcesas a

8

weapon during riots?

Question
Do you think 1ha1!he evidence

of supergrassesshould be or
should not be admissible
without corrobora1ionin 1hc

trials of those charged with
1crroris1•tYp("
offences in
Nonhern Ireland?
Belfast Telegraph•Price Waterhouse Survey

N = 955

January 1985

Source: Be/fas, Telegraph 6 February 1985, p, 7
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The fourth and final component of alienation consists of 'support for
J'f
cal parties that condone violence as a means of effecting political
1
p~ n~e· support for paramilitary groups; support for violence to overthrow
\ a stat'e. • This component reflects alienation at its most intense: a desire to
t ~ect the system by force rather than reform it from within. This
reJ
. - evo Iut10n
. versus revo Iutton
. - 1s
.
dichotomy within the Catho 1·
1c commuruty
atched, respectively, by the struggle between SDLP and PSF. These two
marties have been competing for the soul of the Catholic community. In the
iast three elections, for the regional Assembly in 1982, for the Westminster
Parliament in 1983, and for the European Parliament in 1984, PSF won
350/o,430Joand 380Jorespectively of the Catholic vote .
The policies of the PSF party, and the extent of the support for the par ty embody the more extreme forms of alienation found in the Catholic
c;mmunity. The party sees itself, and is widely perceived to be, the
'political wing' of the IRA. Its principal goal is to expel British influence
from Ireland and unite the country. In the meantime, it takes part in all
elections, but only takes its seats in the local government councils. It condones the violence of the IRA on the grounds that this violence is a justified
response to the presence of British troops on Irish soil.
The rapid emergence of the PSF as an electoral force dates back to the
hunger strikes of 1981. These hunger strikes, staged by IRA prisoners claiming recognition of their 'political status,' resulted in ten deaths. The British
government resolutely refused to make any concessions, and this obduracy
Jed to the politicisation of a dormant republican (i.e. extreme nationalist)
vote in the Catholic community. The demonstrations of popular support
for the hunger strikers led to a new awareness of the political leverage that
might be derived from participating in elections. These voters had previously stayed at home: now this dormant alienation was transformed into votes
for an anti-system party, a party that not only fought elections but also condoned violence as a means of political change. As the party conference
heard that November (1981) it was the 'ballot paper in this band and an
Armalite in this hand.' Although the popular support for the hunger
strikers never really engulfed the entire Catholic community, the response
(or lack of response) from the British Government to the strike went a long
way to crystallize hitherto ill-defined alienation on the part of even
moderate Catholics who had become frustrated at the lack of political progress within Northern Ireland. Thus the hunger strikes acted as a catalyst:
PSF was able to take the tide of opportunity at its flood, and even the SDLP
was forced to adopt a more militant posture . Long simmering frustration,
and a feeling that even the non-violent constitutionalism of the SDLP was
failing to get a response from the British government, served to benefit PSF
whose ambivalent attitude towards violence, and more forthright condemnations of Britain, seemed appropriate responses to those who had nothing
to lose, and possibly something to gain, by rejecting the status quo.
The attitude of the PSF towards violence is undoubtedly part of its
electoral appeal. It is also one of the principal features that distinguishes it
from SDLP supporters. It is sometimes alleged that a vote for PSF is a 'vote
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for violence' but this is not wholly true as the figures in Table 3
demonstrate. There is a widespread view within PSF that violence is
sometimes justifiable if only because of the lack of any alternative paths
towards political change. However, there are other facets of the PSF 'image' that attract voters' support. There are shown in the subseq uent table
(Table 4).
Table 3

Question : How strongly do you agree or disagree that the use of violence can sometimes be justified to bring about polhical
change?

Sinn Fein 'lo
Agree

Neither
Disagree

7

7

8
81

22
I

D .K./ No opinion

Source: MORI Poll (unpublished) June 1984

SDLP%

70

4

N= 1639

Table 4
Statement which fit respondents' ideas and impressions orSinn Fein.
1

Extrcmc'
'Makes the Bri1ish
take notice of the
nationalists'
1
Tough'
•Active in the local

Inn Fein Volcn •10
IO

'Has good leaders"

•1•ve always sup~
por1ed 1he par1y's

84

views'
'Ou, or ,ouch'

34

'Behind the times'
'Trustworthy'

56
2
58

·caring'

a solution to the

51

'Britain '

troubles'
'Represents people
like me'

58

community'

'EviJ'
'Has good policies'
'Offers most hope of

Source: MORI Poll (unpublished) June 1984

'Moderate'
"Too cooptrativc with

Sinn Fein Voters 'It
41

42
2

2
21
16
9

N=562

We have already established that there is considerable support among
PSF voters for the use of violence to bring about political change. We have
also seen (in Table 4) that the appeal of the party is broader than a mere
mandate for the gunman. Clearly, PSF voters perceive their party as being
well-led, active in local communities, representative of its grass-roots and,
above all, (cited by 840Joof PSF voters) able to make the British government
take notice of nationalist demands. As the PSF is the 'political wing' of the
IRA it is worth considering the views taken by PSF supporters towards the
IRA. Does the link between the party and the paramilitary organization
constitute a life-support system for the party? The answer appears to be
'yes.' Whereas 390Jo of SDLP voters agree that the 'IRA are basically
patriots and idealists,' this figure rises to 770Jo for PSF vote rs. 21 On the
more specific policy question of whether PSF should 'renounce the armed
campaign of the IRA' only 220Jo of PSF voters agree (exactly the same
percentage that is against violence for political change in Table 3).
The support for the violence of the IRA among four out of five of PSF
voters represents the extreme point on the continuum of 'a lienation' ranging across our four 'components:' at one extreme, a desire to work within
the system, but at the other a marked inclination to overthrow the system by
force. An investigation of the principal demographic features of the PSF
support shows it to be young, from the lower socioeconomic strata, often
unemployed, and more likely to be male than female. Some of these
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features of PSF support can be seen in Table 5, while comparisons with the
SDLP can be made.
Table 5

Som• comparisons between •h• SDLPand PSF.
Base: Catholic voters in European election 1984 (June)

PSF

Age

380/o
220/,
16'1,

18-34
35-54
55+
Gender
Male
Female
Socioeconomic

PSF
340/o
240/o

PSF

statw:

ABCI

66'1,
330/o

200/o
C2DE

Sourtt: MORI Poll (unpublishtd) June 1984

SDLP
460/o
580/,
650/,

SDLP
540/o

640/,

SDLP
510/,

N~4S1

Comparisons with the 'constitutional' SDLP are instructive, PSF is a
young party and is firmly based in the lower socioeconomic echelons of the
Catholic community. About 500Joof PSF voters are under 34 (compared
with 290/o of SDLP voters). One-fifth of PSF support comes from nonmanual socioeconomic groups, while one-third of SDLP support does. 31 OJo
of PSF supporters are unemployed; but only 130Joof SDLP supporters.
Asked what the cause of the Northern Ireland problem is, PSF supporters
are more likely to see it as a clash of national identity, and less likely to see it
as a problem of 'terrorism' than SDLP supporters. Both Catholic parties
evince strong dissatisfaction with the British Government's handling of the
situation in the Province, but this dissatisfaction is much stronger in PSF
than it is in the SDLP. The crucial difference between the two parties is their
attitudes towards violence. As we have seen (see Table 3) PSF supporters
are much more likely to condone violence than SDLP supporters and while
290Joof PSF voters say they 'strongly' agree that violence is sometimes
justified, only 1OJoof SDLP voters fall into this extreme category. 22
Conclusion: policy implications
Faced with widespread alienation within the Catholic community,
ranging from those who accept the status quo and are willing to make it
work, through to those who see violent change as the only hope of reform,
the British government is forced to steer a middle course between the men of
violence and the 'constitutional' politicians. But, unfortunately, concessions made to the latter are often seen, and claimed, as concessions to the
former.
Since 1969, when the present spate of civil unrest erupted, the British
government has responded to the crisis along three avenues: security,
economics, politics. In the political field, there have been several attempts
to construct a framework of devolved government within which the two
communities could cooperate to their mutual benefit. So far, this has not
been achieved. The brief power-sharing experiment of 1974 lasted five
months but was eventually wrecked by Loyalist (i.e. extreme Protestant)

85

reactions to the proposed North-South Council of Ireland which was
perceived as the thin end of a wedge that would lead to a united Ireland . The
present 78-man Assembly in Belfast is the latest experiment. Its role is purely advisory and consultative although the intention is that legislative powers
could be devolved to it if there was sufficient cross-community consensus to
warrant it. At the moment this seems unlikely as the two Catholic part ies
PSF and the SDLP, are boycotting the Assembly because it excludes both
an 'Irish dimension' (i.e. with the Republic) and any real recogniti on of
Irish identity among Cattiolics in Northern Ireland. Since 1973, proportional representation has been introduced into local and regional elections
in Northern Ireland (a novelty in the United Kingdom) with the aim of
enhancing the influence of the Catholic minority in political affairs . While
this has undoubtedly happened, it has also led to the splitting of the con fessional 'blocs,' into two parties each, so that extremists on both sides now
have parties to themselves (PSF for the Catholics, DUP for the
Protestants). The prospects for reconciliation between moderates in each
community is now more remote because the 'moderate' parties (OUP for
Protestants, SDLP for Catholics) have to look over their shoulders at the
more militant policies of the parties on their flanks.
Security policy has made progress in its primary aim: the reducti on in
the number of fatalities in the Province. In 1972 over four hundre d people
died in the region; now the annual total is less than one hundred. The cost
has been high in terms of alienating the Catholic community. Special
legislation giving the police wide powers of arrest, detention, and inter rogation; long periods of remand; the abolition of juries for many trials; the use
of supergrasses; the apparent immunity from conviction of policemen or
soldiers who murder civilians; and the overwhelming Protestant comp osition of the security forces: all these facets of the security policy of the
Government combine to minimize the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of
the Catholic community. The policy of 'Ulsterisation' - the policy of
transferring the burden of security to locally recruited personnel - has done
little to kindle hope in the Catholic community that law and order will be
impartially administered.
Economic policy has consisted of building up the infrastructure of the
Province - roads, houses, harbours, energy supplies - so that foreign investment will stimulate greater employment opportunities. Per capita expenditure is higher in the Province than in the rest of the United Kingdom : and
so is the dependence on welfare handouts.
The Government's policy towards PSF consists of a 'twin-track' approach: encouraging constitutional nationalism (as expressed in the SDLP)
and ostracising PSF representatives at Ministerial level. However, PSF is a
legal party and both civil servants and local councillors are expected to deal
with them in the normal way. This partial boycott of PSF representatives is
defended on the grounds that PSF refuses to condemn violence, and as a
way of bolstering the 'parliamentary' tactics of the SDLP.
Faced by an alienated minority, a central government has, in theory, a
range of options extending from total suppression of the minority to a full
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nition of its separate identity via the creation of a separate state.
recog
· IS
· re 1evant to N or th er~ I re_Ian d sI?ce
.
Neither of these extreme p~ 1·
I~Ies
supsion of a minority cons1stmg of 40% of the population IS unthmkable,
pres
·
· 1·
d territorial separateness is ruled out bYt he mtermmg
mg o f t he two comanunities. In between these extremes there lies a variety of options including
:nsociationalism, cantonisation, total absorption, pluralism and reloca~ion. so far, the Government has bee~ attempting a policy of 'i_ntegration'
or 'homogenisation' - a policy of treatmg the Cathohc commumty as equal
citizens of the United Kingdom: and much progress has been made in
legislating away discrimin~tory pra~tices_and prov_idingadequate _economic
resources. But it looks as If even this policy, even 1f successful, will have to
make way for a new policy of pluralism (or more strictly 'binationalism') in
order to satisfy the aspirations of the militant elements in the Catholic community. Already there have been straws in the wind: talk of the 'Irish identity' in Government circles, the financing of an Irish speaking school in
Belfast, the refusal to proscribe PSF, and most recently the banning of provocative Protestant marches through Catholic residential areas. Otherwise,
very little has been done officially to grant the Irish identity of Catholics its
legitimate place in Northern Ireland, or to give Catholics access to policymaking in a meaningful sense, or to ensure that law, order and justice apply
to aJl without fear or favour. If alienation means 'feeling a stranger in one's
own country' then there is scope for making the Catholic community feel
that they have a stake in the society they inhabit: if one is treated like an
outsider, it is likely that one will behave like an outsider.
Attempts by the Government to promote 'binationalism' run into the
problem of Protestant opposition. Lately, one has heard the phrase 'Protestant alienation' - a term loosely referring to the reactions of IRA violence,
and 'reforms' by the Government to enhance Catholic political and
economic participation. The situation is not a bi-polar one with the Protestants and British ranged against the Catholic community. On the contrary the situation is triangular: both communities are to some extent
alienated from British rule, 23 albeit for different reasons and to different
degrees. Thus the strategy of the Government, or any government faced by
a multi-ethnic society, has to be that of 'balancing' interests and seeking the
issues that bind rather than those that divide. Given the demographic trends
in Northern Ireland, it seems advisable for the 'majority' of today to
negotiate the terms for survival of tomorrow's minority.
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